

On the Nature of Neurosis: How can We See it from a Standpoint of Jung's Psychology?

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Abstracts: In this paper, the author attempted to discuss the nature of neurosis from a viewpoint of Jung's psychology. The relation between Jung's own experience of neurosis in his boyhood and his theory of neurosis established in later years was first examined, from which the author pointed out that Jung's theory of neurosis had been based on his own experience of neurosis from long ago. Then, the concept of dissociation in Jung's psychology was critically discussed, through which the author insisted that the concept of dissociation had been primal in Jung's psychopathology but, for this reason, Jung's psychology could not help being led into so-called dissociative state in its own way of being. In the end, it was proposed that the actual task of psychology today is to see various phenomena as a trial to transform the status of our consciousness on the basis of the soul's intention.

Keywords: Neurosis, Jung's psychology, dissociation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Psychotherapy, in the sense that Frau Anna O., a patient of J. Breuer who was the first collaborator of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, excellently expressed it as 'talking cure', would be regarded as having its origin in Freud's treatment for hysterics with free association, although, as Ellenberger (1970) showed in his voluminous work, *The Discovery of the Unconscious*, before it there had certainly been so-called folk remedies which correspond to its ancestor [2].

As well known, based on his clinical experience with neurotics Freud specified the aetiology of neurosis as psychogenesis and then established psychoanalysis as his psychology, which has immeasurably influenced upon the sphere of psychology and psychiatry in later generation. He dedicated himself to making up his psychoanalysis as one faculty of natural sciences and thus earnestly attempted to construct the mechanism of out-breaking of neurosis and the theory of its treatment with strict causal thinking. Therein, behind neurosis he penetrated the patient's incestuous desires that come from his/her *infantile sexuality*, and had the idea that the neurosis can be cured only when their *libido* which, seen from a view point of psycho-sexual development, has been fixated on the undesirable object, such as his/her father or mother, restores its normal and healthy stream. According to him, this would become possible by that with the therapist's interpretations the patient works through the psychical relationship with his/her parents that is being transferred on the actual

therapeutic relationship [3]. In this regard, we can assume that the treatment of neurosis by psychoanalysis of those days was exclusively based on so-called reductive/causationistic thinking.

However, there were several psychologists, who were completely against Freud's understanding of neurosis seen above and thus separated from him. Among them, we can find out the two Giants, Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung.

Adler saw the will to power hidden in the psychology of neurotics and thus insisted on the necessity to understand neuroses not from a standpoint of causality but from a standpoint of teleology [1]. It is certain that in his theory of neurosis he gave up the idea that neurosis breaks out as a result of an event in the past, while on the other hand we cannot easily say that he could completely deliver himself from such a causal framework. That is because we can also regard his teleological standpoint merely as the reverse of Freud's causationistic view toward neurosis in the sense that he thought that neurosis occurs to fulfil something in future.

In that sense, as will be seen later, neither merely depending on nor rejecting both of Freud's and Adler's ideas, Jung's theory of neurosis was first able to establish its own original standpoint. Jung described Freud's psychology of neurosis as follows:

Freud's greatest achievement probably consisted in taking neurotic patients seriously and entering into their peculiar individual psychology. He had the courage to let the case material speak for itself, and in this way was able to penetrate into the real psychology of his patients. He saw with the patient's eyes, so to speak, and so reached a deeper understanding of mental

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illness than had hitherto been possible (MDR, p. 192) [28].

On the other hand, concerning Freud's attitude of this kind Jung criticizes that patient and doctor [20] are riding 'the same hobby-horse' (CW 10, par. 362) and also mentions, 'Freud, it seems, took these neurotic conjectures quite seriously and thus fell [20] into the same traps as the neurotic....' (ibid., par. 365)

I think that Jung's seemingly different two views toward Freud's psychology such as quoted above should be regarded not only as contradictory with each other but also as becoming true only when they are together. That is to say, we can see that psychoanalysis could limitlessly gain access to the psychology of neurotics by elucidating the pathology of neurosis with its reductive/causationistic thinking, but from another viewpoint we can also say that, just because such reductive/causationistic thinking itself is very neurotic, psychoanalysis could do that.

In this paper, from a standpoint of analytical psychology that Jung, who could see that the causal thinking included within psychoanalysis itself is neurotic, established, I shall discuss on what the nature of neurosis is, and furthermore try to make obvious what Jung himself failed to see in his theory of neurosis.

First, we will have to see how the notion of neurosis can be placed in the history of human psyche. That is because, as will be seen later, neurosis is inseparably twined with our modern, or natural scientific, way of thinking.

2. THE NOTION OF NEUROSIS IN THE HISTORY OF HUMAN PSYCHE: ITS PARALLELISM WITH NATURAL SCIENTIFIC/CAUSATIONISTIC THINKING

In the *Weltanschauung* before Christianity, the mythological world had spread itself between the Earth and the Heaven. People lived in the mythological world, wherein they were completely surrounded by Gods and Goddesses, or Nature. Namely, the sun, the moon, stars, various weather phenomena, such as rain, window and thunder, animals, plants, trees, and stones, all of them themselves were representative of divine images, for which they had awe feelings, which was deeply penetrating their life as a whole. Of course, in their cosmology, there was no outside; all was inside of it. In such olden days, the distinction, or discrimination, between inside and outside, or subject and object, had not yet been established; the people were being embedded within the naïve unity with Gods and Goddesses, or Nature.

However, as Kawai (1985) mentioned, in the Christian *Weltanschauung* Spirit (or Logos) was separated from Flesh and then transformed itself into Flesh [30]. Thus, it turns out that the Heaven and the Earth was separated from each other and at the same time united with each other in one point. With this, the mythological world that had beforehand spread itself between the Heaven and the Earth has come to disappear. That is to say, although in Greek *Weltanschauung* there had been three realms, such as Spirit, Soul, and Flesh, by going through Christianity and then Descartes we have come to reach the dualism of Spirit and Flesh wherein the realm of Soul and images should be excluded. This fleshy spirit is justly tantamount to technology.

Nothing but such technology as 'fleshy spirit' can be regarded as a symbol of modern times. Moreover, the one point where the Heaven and the Earth was both divided and united, with which the technology could be actualized, was the germ of the modern ego-conscious. It was no longer oriented toward that which had been surrounding the people since there was nothing to see outside any longer; it was oriented only toward itself. Even after the Christian-monotheistic God succeeded in eliminating the polytheistic mythological world, the people could be closely connected with the land of God through the Church, that is, hold the monotheistic mythological *Weltanschauung* in their mind. However, going through such historical move-ments as the establishment of Christian Catholicism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, Descartes, the Enlightenment, and then German Idealism, the people have come to establish their own standpoint that was separated from both Nature and God, and then oriented only toward itself, in other words, the consciousness of consciousness. I am of the opinion that this is the birth of the modern individuality.

From the above discussion, we can easily find a certain parallelism between the birth and development of modern individuality and those of technology/natural sciences. That is because, in the *Weltanschauung* of modern natural science, the discrimination between inside and outside, subject and object, which had not yet been established before modern times, was the absolute premise; none other than the modern consciousness as reflecting on one's own consciousness made the above-mentioned discrimination possible.

Therefore, it was not incidental but necessary that psychology whose subject was the human consciousness has been established in modern times; the necessity of psychology first took place when the

modern consciousness detached from the former naïve unity with both Nature and God. In that sense, we can say that the people dwelling in the mythological world had no need for psychology. That is because in the polytheistic or monotheistic mythological world where all was inside and there was no outside, the people had no necessity to establish the reflective standpoint toward their own consciousness.

Following this stream, in the sphere of psychiatry, the clinical entity or notion of neurosis came to be discussed so often. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Charcot, Janet, and Freud began to earnestly research neurosis called hysteria one after another. The main characteristic of its psychology was described by the notion of dissociation.

However, if we well see the above-mentioned history of human psyche, the dissociation should be regarded as a psychological necessity, too. That is because the discrimination between inside and outside, subject and object, and conscious and unconscious, that is, the dissociation, was the indispensable premise for establishing the modern consciousness. (Due to the fact that all of modern mankind cannot be regarded as suffering from neurosis, I think that the dissociation itself is neither neurotic nor pathological. Concerning this point, I shall discuss below).

Probably, when taking the methodology of natural science into consideration, we can more easily understand that dissociation should be regarded as a psychological necessity. Namely, in the framework of natural science, on the strict premise that the observer should accurately be separated from the observed, one tries to analyze the objective phenomena or facts exclusively based on causality and then extract a certain law from such analysis. There, we must accept the discrimination between the observed and the observer as its inevitable methodological premise.

The problem herein is not the discrimination itself but to absorb ourselves in this discrimination without any reflection, that is, to forget that this discrimination has been practiced just in its methodology. Indeed, although the objective fact should have been viewed as created through its peculiar *Weltanschauung*, natural science has come to deal with, or see, the objective fact as absolute.

This kind of trap in which modern natural science has fallen, it seems to me, overlaps with the mechanism of neurosis which Freud discovered from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century in his clinical practice with hysteric patients. We

must appreciate it as his outstanding discovery that what neurotics spoke to him as their own traumatic experience should be viewed not only as factual but also as created by their fantasy. I think that this idea of Freud's obviously has the similarity with that natural science, forgetting that the observed fact is merely created through its own *Weltanschauung*, has unwittingly regarded the observed fact as absolute or immovable. In this sense too, we psychologists have to fully recognize that, as Hillman (1983) stated, 'a trauma is not what happened but the way to see what happened' (p. 47) [10].

However, Freud himself failed to comprehend such a parallelism between natural science and neurosis and thus, as Jung described, fell into riding 'the same hobby horse' (CW 10, pars. 362) with his patients. That is to say, although, as mentioned [20] above, such attitude as trying to one-sidedly explain phenomena on the basis of causality is the very neurosis in itself, psychoanalysis nevertheless earnestly attempted to understand neurosis in the framework of natural science without any reflection toward the *Weltanschauung* of natural science as such. (On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, we must admit that just because of this failure psychoanalysis could remarkably gain access to the psychology of neurotics). I think that this is why Freud could not help but introduce the concept of *psychical reality* into his psychology, which should not be regarded as radical conversion from natural science; it was merely the reverse of the objective fact = external reality in natural science.

As seen before, Adler's theory of neurosis was quite different from Freud's, but cannot be regarded as remarkably re-visioning Freud's since he still had the idea that neurosis takes place to fulfil something in future, which is merely the reverse of Freud's theory based on causality. After these two great psychologists, Jung has appeared in the history of depth psychology. I think that it was none other Jung who could most radically re-examine psychology of neurosis.

As will be seen in the following part, Jung held that neurosis comes from *disunion with oneself* and then attempted to thoroughly seek its aetiology in the present, and neither in the past nor in the future. In addition, he attached much importance not to explaining it but to living through it. This seems to be a crucial difference from Freud's and Adler's view toward neurosis; they attempted to unite the dissociation from *without* by re-connecting their patients' psyche to the *past* or the *future*, while on the other hand Jung

exclusively thought much of remaining in the *present* and then attempted to unite with the dissociation from *within*. In other words, Jung approached and then entered into the dissociation, and never covered it.

3. JUNG'S THEORY OF NEUROSIS

It is very important for understanding Jung's theory of neurosis to know his experience of neurosis with fainting fit in his twelfth year. That is because, as will be seen later, this experience in boyhood can be regarded as inseparably married with his later views toward neurosis. First, let us take a glance at his own experience of neurosis.

3.1. Jung's Experience of Neurosis

His experience of neurosis in his twelfth year corresponds to a kind of school refusal state, which was touched off by the following event; suddenly another boy gave him a shove that knocked him off his feet. He fell, striking his head against the kerbstone so hard. At the moment he felt the blow the thought flashed through his mind: 'Now you won't have to go to school any more' (see *MDR*, p. 46) [28].

According to *Memories*, in his earlier days Jung had been poor at mathematics and drawing, and still more 'from the very first... hated gymnastics' (ibid., p. 45). Certainly he had been a so-called maladapted child in his classes, but kept on going to school. However, after the event mentioned above he came to have fainting spells whenever he had to return to school, and whenever his parents set him to doing his homework. As a result, for more than six months he was obliged to stay away from school. For him, this period had been 'a picnic' (ibid., p. 46), he could dream, be anywhere he liked, in the woods or by the water, or paint, and devote himself to resuming his 'battle pictures and furious scenes of war, of old castles that were being assaulted or burned, or drew page upon page of caricatures' (ibid., pp. 46-7). He then plunged into 'the world of the mysterious' (ibid., p. 47) and thus came to be separated from this world all the more. Nevertheless, he had the obscure feeling, 'I was fleeing from myself' (ibid.) on the other hand.

A shocking event occurred to Jung as follows: Before then his parents had consulted many doctors about him, but obtained no clear reply from them. One of them even thought that he had epilepsy. One day of this period, he heard his father replying as follows when a visitor asked, 'And how is your son?': 'Ah, that's a sad business. ... The doctors no longer know what is wrong with him. They think it may be epilepsy. It would

dreadful if he were incurable. I have lost what little I had, and what will become of the boy if he cannot earn his own living?' (ibid.) Then he was thunderstruck and, according to him, this was the collision with reality. He thought suddenly, 'Why, then, I must get to work!' (ibid.) And from then on he started trying to overcome his neurotic symptom, fainting spell and continued it until he had the feeling that he had overcome the attacks (see ibid., pp. 47-8).

A few weeks later Jung returned to school. According to him, 'That was when I learned what a neurosis is' (ibid., p. 48). Namely, he then understood clearly that he himself had arranged this whole disgraceful situation and knew that his classmate, who had given him a shove before, 'had been put up to it, so to speak, and that the whole affair was a diabolical plot' (ibid.) on his part.

In this way, Jung delivered himself from the neurosis at that time.

3.2. Neurosis is New-Made Every Day

As shown below, from so early time on, Jung was doubtful about the hypothesis of *sexual trauma* or *fixation of libido* as aetiology of neurosis. The former had been adopted by early psychoanalysis, but around 1897 Freud himself could not help giving it up since he came to the conclusion that his patients' sexual traumatic experience should not always be factual as a result of increasing his clinical experience. Instead, Freud came to adopt the hypothesis of *fixation of libido* as aetiology of neurosis. However, the term *libido* Freud then used was exclusively sexual, so Jung clearly criticized Freud's attitude of this kind in his paper 'Psychoanalysis and Neurosis' (1916). '...I must admit that a purely sexual aetiology of neurosis seems to me much too narrow. ... In the place of it I should like to introduce an *energetic viewpoint* into the psychology of neurosis' (*CW* 4, pars. 565-66).

When Jung wrote his book *The Psychology of Dementia Praecox* in 1907 (*CW* 3, pars. 143 ff) [11], he used the term *psychic energy* in place of *libido* through his concern for Freud. However, he finally used the term *libido* in a different meaning from Freud's in the *Symbols of Transformation* (1911-12).

From Jung's energetic viewpoint, the concept *libido* is not limited in the sexual meaning alone, but can be understood as 'a general term for desire' (*CW* 5, par. 186) [13] and 'as vital energy in general, or as Bergson's *élan vital*' (*CW* 4, par. 568) [15]. This corresponds to the meaning of *psychic energy* he had

used before. Moreover, he pointed out that his own usage or definition of *libido* was more valid than Freud's also in its etymology (CW 5, par. 188) [13].

If we consider the fact that the completion of *Symbols of Transformation*, which had been entitled *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* until its fourth revision in 1952, touched off their decisive separation, then we can see that this difference of their views toward *libido* played one of the crucial roles therein. In what Jung wrote about psychoanalysis and neurosis in those days, we can easily follow this trace.

For instance, by using the term, *libido*, Jung described neurosis in his paper 'The Theory of Psychoanalysis' (1913) as follows:

When the libido is not used for purpose of real adaptation it is always more or less introverted. The material content of the psychic world consists of memories, that is, of material from the individual's past (aside from actual perception). ... The patients then live more or less entirely in the world of the past (CW 4, pars. 304) [14].

Here Jung does not confine *libido* into sexuality any longer, but uses it in such a wider sense as seen above, especially in referring to *psychic energy* which should be originally toward 'purpose of real adaptation'.

In the same article Jung, showing the following example, tries to answer a question of why the libido was not used for real adaptation and then became regressive (see *ibid.*, par. 381).

A mountain climber, attempting the ascent of a certain peak, happens to meet with insurmountable obstacles, for instance, a precipitous rock-face whose ascent is a sheer impossibility. After vainly seeking another route, he will turn back and regretfully abandon the idea of conquering that peak. He will say to himself. 'It is not in my power to get over this difficulty, so I will climb an easier mountain'.

In such a case, if he had really met an insurmountable difficulty, his decision would have been a normal utilization of libido. While on the other hand, if the rock-face had not been really unclimbable, he would have deceived himself. Namely, 'on the one hand he has a correct appreciation of the situation, on the other hand he hides this knowledge from himself, behind the illusion of his bravery'.

Jung goes on to say in the same paragraph: 'He draws back not because of any real impossibility but

because of an artificial barrier invented by himself. He has fallen into *disunion with himself*. From this moment on he suffers from an internal conflict' (my italics) [14].

In this way, behind one's neurosis, Jung's psychology, from the energetic viewpoint, beheld the *will to adaptation*, and neither the *infantile sexuality* in Freud's nor the *will to power* in Adler's. He was of the opinion that Freud and Adler explained neurosis exclusively from the infantile angle (CW 10, par. 343) [20].

Jung thought that a neurotic earnestly tries to escape from performing his actual task, *adaptation*, and take refuge in his neurotic thinking or feeling, and that, in this sense, he does not confront his real condition and 'may perhaps believe that, except for his neurosis, he is a normal person, fully adapted to the condition of life' (CW 4, par. 313) [14]. That is to say, the neurotic cannot be even aware that his attitude or thought of this kind is truly neurotic in itself.

In Jung's views or theory of neurosis such as seen above, the true causes of neurosis 'lie mainly in the present' and 'here alone are the possibilities of removing them' (*ibid.*, par. 373). He also mentions in his later paper in 1934 as follows:

The true reason of neurosis always lies in the present, since the neurosis exists in the present. It is definitely not a hangover from the past, a *caput mortuum*; it is fed and as it were new-made every day. And it is only in the today, not in our yesterdays, that the neurosis can be 'cured.' Because the neurotic conflict has to be fought today, any historical deviation is a detour, if not actually a wrong turning. (CW 10, par. 363) [20].

Therefore, in his theory of neurosis, seeking aetiology of neurosis in the remote past makes no sense any longer. If he should do so with his patient, a therapist too would be trapped by the same neurotic thinking and feeling. In order to escape from falling into the same trap as the neurotics, we therapists, as Jung insisted, have to recognize and ask as follows:

We no longer ask whether the patient has a father or mother complex, or unconscious incest fantasies which tie him to his parents, for we know today that everybody has them. It was a mistake to believe that only neurotics have such things. We ask rather: What is the task which the patient does not want to fulfil? What difficulty is he trying to avoid? (CW 4, par. 409) [14].

Based on such an outline, it seems to be obvious that Jung's views toward neurosis as quoted above are deeply connected with his own experience of neurosis in boyhood. Namely, the moment he was knocked off his feet by his friend's shove and then fell down on the ground, he felt the blow the thought flashed through his mind, 'Now you won't have to go to school any more' (MDR, p. 46) [28]; he had already grasped his own situation as a whole, that is, his own maladaptation in school, and his own wish to escape from the actual task of *adaptation*; he had already seen through to the true body of his neurosis from the very beginning. Therefore, on the one hand, he devoted himself to dreaming, walking around in the woods or by the water and drawing paintings, on the other hand, he had the obscure feeling, 'I was fleeing from myself' (ibid., p. 47).

These insights he then got can be said to completely overlap with his later psychological views toward neurosis, such as that 'The true reason of neurosis always lies in the present...' (CW 10, par. 363) [20], 'In reality the neurosis is manufactured anew every day...' (CW 5, par. 655), the neurosis is tantamount to 'evading the demands of real life' (CW 4, par. 298) [14]. For both as a boy and as a psychologist Jung, it was only in the present, and not in the remote past, that neurosis could be 'cured' (CW 10, par. 363) [20].

In that sense, we can say that the basis of his theory of neurosis had already been established in his experience of neurosis in boyhood; such experience, in other words, had already contained almost everything indispensable which as a psychologist he developed as his own theory of neurosis afterward.

Because of these insights he had already obtained, Jung could start trying to overcome his neurotic symptom, fainting spell, soon after the moment he heard his father's lament about him. His father's voice he then heard was, in a sense, the voice of the truth, transcending the actual father's, which he could receive since he had already seen through to the true body of his neurosis. In other words, the voice was available for his psyche at that time. In that sense, we can also say that the dimension of the soul, or the psyche, opens itself only through the present, and neither through the past nor through the future.

Such observation reminds us of Jung's words. 'The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression I can use for this activity is fantasy' (CW 6, par. 78) [17]. In this respect, we have to realize that both of his

friend's shove and his father's lament mentioned above should be regarded as reality his psyche created. Namely, we have to refrain ourselves from seeing that he fell into the neurosis *because* of his friend's shove, or he could recover from the neurosis *because* of his father's lament. That is too cheap, in other words, unduly reductive or causationistic.

Therefore, in our context, it is very meaningful that he himself says, '... I saw clearly that I myself had arranged this whole disgraceful situation' (MDR, p. 48) or 'I knew that ... [28] the whole affair was a diabolical plot on my part' (ibid.). That is because here he, it seems, did not misunderstand his fantasy as an immovable fact, but saw through it to itself.

As shown above, in Jung's theory of neurosis it comes no other than from the *present disunion with oneself*, and neither from one's incestuous desire based on the *past* unsolved *infantile sexuality*, nor from the *will to power* oriented toward the *future*. In that sense, we may say that, whatever events touched off the neurosis, this event should not be regarded as an immovable fact, but rather we have to see that it belongs to the reality which the patient's psyche is ceaselessly creating.

4. JUNG'S BASIC FAULT IN PSYCHOLOGY OF NEUROSIS

As seen in last part, Jung's understanding of neurosis could excellently grasp the nature of neurosis, but at the same time I think that there was something he failed to see therein. That seems to be well reflected in his view toward the relation between the notion of neurosis and dissociation.

4.1. The Relation between Neurosis and Dissociation in Jung's Psychology

According to Walrond-Skinner (1986), *dissociation* is a term introduced into the nineteenth century psychology by Janet and adopted in Freud's early theories of hysteria but dropped and superseded by repression afterward; it is the separating off of mental contents such as thoughts, feelings, and fantasies from the individual's conscious awareness; the mental contents which are thus separated off can be either conscious or unconscious, and although they are disowned and separated from the rest of the personality, they are not necessarily *repressed* or *projected* onto someone else (pp. 101-2) [32]. I think the reason why Freud abandoned it from his psychology is that he had come to lay stress much

more on the function, or mechanism, of the psyche than on its phenomenology.

On the other hand, in Jung's psychology the concept *dissociation*, it seems to me, has had one and the most important role from beginning to last. This is well reflected in the following facts.

First, Jung's psychology includes within itself various opposites as its psychological concepts, such as ego/self, introvert/extrovert, individual/collective, anima/animus, conscious/unconscious, persona/shadow, the first half of life/the second half of life, eros/logos, and senex/puer. In this regard, we can say that, as Hillman (1979) pointed out, his psychology is thoroughly oppositional and, without significant exception, all his major concepts are arranged in pairs [9]. With such oppositionally organized concepts, certainly we can understand the *dissociation* in neurosis or the splitting, or fragmentation, in schizophrenia. However, from another viewpoint, we can also say that, although it always points out the peril of dissociation or splitting in the psyche, Jung's psychology itself contains various kinds of opposite and thus cannot avoid facing the danger of becoming one-sided or fragmented. Indeed, we must admit that Jung's psychology, as a theory, contains the *dissociation*, or splitting, from the beginning.

Secondly, it was the union of opposites that Jung earnestly researched by dedicating himself to a great deal of alchemical works especially in the latter half of his studies. In other words, we can say that it is the main theme of his psychology how one could, or could not, re-unite the opposed two which had originally made oneness and then been separated from each other. This is thoroughly described in his last voluminous work *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (1955-56), whose sub-title is 'An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy'.

Thirdly, in the relation with our later discussion it would be especially important that in his psychology, or psychopathology, the difference, or the similarity, between neurosis and schizophrenia could be explained by making use of the concept *dissociation*.

For instance, Jung stated in his paper 'Recent Thought on Schizophrenia' (1957), 'This concept [schizophrenia] stresses the difference between neurotic and psychotic *dissociation*, the former being a 'systematic' *dissociation* of the personality, the latter a 'physiological' and unsystematic disintegration of the psychic elements, that is, of the ideational content' (CW

3, par. 544, my italics) [26]. We can see the same kind of formulation in his paper 'Schizophrenia' (1958) [27], too. Furthermore, also in his former paper 'On the Psychogenesis of Schizophrenia' (1939) he mentioned, 'A neurosis is a relative *dissociation*, a conflict between the ego and a resistant force based upon unconscious contents' (CW 3, par. 516, my italics) [22].

From these, we can guess that Jung was consistent in his idea that neurosis is a kind of *dissociation* and that *dissociation* is in itself pathological. However, is the true body of neurosis really *dissociation*? And if that is the case, is it possible not only for Jung's psychology but also for psychology in general to integrate, or re-unite, the *dissociation*?

4.2. Can Psychology, or Psychotherapy, Really Integrate Dissociation?

As already mentioned, Jung had the idea that neurosis comes from *disunion with oneself*, and then tried to thoroughly seek its aetiology in the *present*, and neither in the *past* nor in the *future*, and furthermore, attempted to unite with the dissociation from *within* not by covering it but by approaching and entering into it.

As quoted at the outset, Jung depicted Freud's views toward neurosis as riding 'the same hobby-horse' (CW 10, par. 362) with neurotics. Moreover, in the same paper, he also states as follows: 'Psychotherapy today, it seems to me, still has a vast amount to unlearn and relearn. ... But first it must cease thinking neurotically and see the psychic processes in true perspective. Not only the whole conception of neurosis, but our ideas about the psychic functions themselves. ...' (ibid., par. 369).

In the paper of Jung, we can find many of such critical formulations for psychology, especially for Freud's psychology as quoted above. In his earlier book *Symbols of Transformation* (1911-12), too, Jung criticized Freud's psychology, 'Freud makes his theory of neurosis—so admirably suited to the nature of neurosis—much too dependent on the neurotic ideas from which precisely the patients suffer' (CW 5, par. 655).

As Jung repeatedly mentions, it is certain that Freud's theory of neurosis exclusively originated in his clinical experience with neurotics, and his theory justly served their thinking and feeling as regards seeking the cause of their neurosis in the remote past. In that sense, we can say that Freud was evidently falling into the same traps with the neurotics.

However, we can also say that, as mentioned before, Freud's psychology, because of its neurotic tendency, could reach the psychology of neurotics and, to a certain extent, be therapeutic. Moreover, the same can be said not only in Freud's psychology but also in every psychology. In that sense, we psychologists have to recognize that every psychology includes the possibility to be neurotic, and must not attempt to deliver themselves from such possibility. That is because, if a psychology should try to do that, the psychology would not be able to be therapeutic.

In the sense that Hillman (1983) properly mentioned, 'Psychotherapy can only stay with its own inferiority if it is to remain psychotherapeutic' (p. 128), psychology can only, or has to, stay with the possibility, or peril, to fall into neurosis. That is because it is justly neurotic to literally try to escape from neurosis. If so, the psychology cannot help degrading itself into 'pop psychology' [7] as Giegerich (1998a) described. Here only one thing we have to pay attention is that there is a crucial difference between having the possibility to fall into neurosis and actually falling into neurosis.

This is closely connected with the above-mentioned historical background of the birth of psychology or the notion of dissociation. Namely, the reason why psychology always exposes itself to the danger to fall into neurosis is that psychology has been established on the premise of dissociation. That people began to need psychology and that they have come to possess the consciousness of their own consciousness are inseparably married with each other. Therein the dissociation has already taken place. As well known, the most classical methodology of modern psychology was called self-observation, in which the dissociation between *reflecting oneself* and *reflected oneself* are being created without interruption.

Just due to the dissociation as its own nature, psychology always has to confront the peril to be neurotic, but, as will be seen later, this does not immediately mean that psychology is neurotic. Rather, we have to see that only when not being aware of, or denying, the dissociation as its own premise, the true neurotic disorder sets in. In this regard, we can say that psychology is destined to refute or negate/to be refuted or negated its own psychological standpoint by its own psychological occupation, only through which it can first realize itself as *truly psychological psychology*. This is probably why Jung excellently stated, '... only the psyche can observe the psyche' (CW 9i, par. 384), and Giegerich (1977) properly mentioned, '... psychology itself must be its own first patient' (p. 168) [4].

As far as it has been established on the premise of dissociation such as mentioned above, psychology, or psychotherapy, cannot re-unite the dissociation any longer. That is because, as seen before, in any psychological occupation *reflecting oneself* and *reflected oneself* are ceaselessly being created.

This seems to me very important in psychotherapy of neurosis. Among a group of neurotics or people visiting psychotherapists without any concrete symptom, there are not so less people who imagine that they will be able to get rid of the actual psychologically uncomfortable condition by knowing about themselves furthermore in psychotherapy. In such a case, what we therapists first have to give attention would be the dissociation hidden behind their desire to know about themselves furthermore. Nay, such desire itself is a crucial dissociation. Namely, from the moment he begins to earnestly wish to reflect on himself, the individual has come to place himself in the dissociation such as mentioned above. We must not take our eyes off from this matter. Otherwise, we would be unable to avoid being lead to another denial of dissociation.

Such psychotherapy is *seemingly* psychological but *actually* not psychological at all. That is because psychology, or psychotherapy, can first realize itself just through reflecting such dissociated itself, and not through denying the dissociation as its own premise. In this sense, too, psychology itself should be regarded as deeply connected with modern times.

Neurosis cannot be cured by covering, or re-uniting, the dissociation from *without*. Rather it opens the world or the soul, and through it we can enter into 'the archetypal world called neurosis' [4]. Only when we recognize this, the neurosis could be cured; one cannot deliver oneself from the neurosis by getting rid of it. Namely, one can deliver oneself from the neurosis only by being aware of one's own inner dissociation, and then entering into the neurosis through the dissociation; in psychotherapy of neurosis, *getting in* and *getting out* are identical with each other, and in this point we can say that the notion of neurosis is extremely paradoxical and dialectical.

Therefore, we can guess that just because of such paradoxical nature of neurosis Jung stated in his paper 'The Meaning of Psychology for Modern Man' (1933), 'When man became conscious, the germ of the sickness of dissociation was planted in his soul, for conscious at once the highest good and the greatest

evil' (CW 10, par. 291) [19], and furthermore, '... the sickness of dissociation in our world is at the same time a process of recovery, or rather, the climax of a period of pregnancy which heralds the throes of birth ... that which brings division ultimately creates union' (ibid., par. 293). (As will be seen later, I think that we should see this 'germ of the sickness' not only as a *pathological phenomenon* but also as a *psychological necessity* for modern human beings. If we should not do that, just there would we fall into a so-called pathological state, that is, neurosis).

Based on the above-developed discussion in this part, we can say as follows:

We can no longer go back to the age when we did not yet have the consciousness of our own consciousness, in other words, when there was no dissociation and we thus could enjoy the naïve unity with the Gods and Great Nature; still more we can no longer re-unite the dissociated two from *without* by psychology, or psychotherapy. Therefore, there remains only one answer for us; what we can do is not to re-unite the dissociation but to unite with the dissociation itself. This is why I above stated, 'In psychotherapy of neurosis, *getting in* and *getting out* are identical with each another'.

This seems to be well expressed in the following Jung's statements about neurosis [20]:

A neurosis is by no means merely a negative thing, it is also something positive. ... In reality *the neurosis contains the patient's psyche*, or at least an essential part of it; and if, as the rationalist pretends, the neurosis could be plucked from him like a bad tooth, he would have gained nothing but would have lost something very essential to him (CW 10, par. 355, my italics).

We should not try to 'get rid' of a neurosis, but rather to experience what it means, what it has to teach, what its purpose is. We should even learn to be thankful for it, otherwise we pass it by and miss the opportunity of getting to know ourselves as we really are. A neurosis is truly removed only when it has removed the false attitude of the ego. *We do not cure it—it cures us.* (ibid., par. 361, my italics).

In this sense, neurosis attacks our consciousness and then transforms its status. Moreover, this goes beyond our individual intention, and is exclusively based on the soul's intention.

4.3. The Union, or the Disunion, with Disunion with Oneself

From the above-developed discussion in this chapter we can see that the true body of neurosis is not dissociation. Rather, only when denying the dissociation as the premise of the ego-consciousness of modern human beings the individual begins to suffer from neurotic disorder. Therefore, we must not naïvely understand disunion with oneself Jung regarded as the aetiology of neurosis. That is to say, just as the modern ego-consciousness is not mere consciousness but consciousness of consciousness, so what the conception of disunion with oneself means is not mere disunion with oneself but disunion with disunion with oneself.

However, as shown, or will be shown, in this paper, Jung could infinitely gain access to this self-contradictory/paradoxical nature of neurosis, but when expressing it in his words he could only naïvely state that neurosis comes from disunion with oneself, or that neurosis is relative dissociation. I think that this is the basic fault in Jung's psychology of neurosis, or its naïveté. (The reason why I regard this naïveté as a fault is that such naïveté is justly tantamount to the neurotic tendency included within Jung's psychology. Moreover, we must admit that just through this *fault* we can deepen Jung's psychology furthermore.)

There seems to be no doubt that Jung was considerably aware of disunion with disunion with oneself as the nature of neurosis. This is well reflected in the fact that he wrote about neurosis in his letter of August 1956 as follows: 'If a man is contradicted by himself and does not know it, he is an illusionist, but if he knows that he contradicts himself, he is individuated' (*Letters* 2, p. 324) [29]. And the germ of such attitude can be found already in the following quotation from his paper 'A Criticism of Bleuler's Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism' (1911) [12]. Herein, unlike Bleuler, Jung was regarding the *resistance*, and not the *ambivalence*, as pathological. Namely, in Jung's idea the so-called pathological condition does not mean that various factors are co-existing in the psyche but that the half-unconscious *will* to deny, or try to escape from, such plural condition, that is, the *resistance* exists therein. In the context of this chapter, we can say that this *resistance* amounts to denial of dissociation, by which the neurotic condition of *disunion with disunion with oneself* can be brought about.

Also, Jung's statement quoted herein, 'neurosis comes from disunion with oneself', or 'if he knows that he contradicts himself, he is individuated', should not be viewed as contradictory with each other, but we have to see that such seemingly contradictory both sides justly expresses the nature of neurosis. If that is the case, we can assume that the *entrance* and the *exit* of neurosis are identical with each other, which is no other than *disunion with oneself*. In that sense, the cure of neurosis can be called the *union with dissociation*, that is, the *union with disunion with oneself*.

This is deeply related with the fact that in his paper 'The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious' (1928) Jung himself from first to last attached much importance not to the *integration* but rather to the *differentiation* between the ego and the unconscious contents on the process of individuation (CW 7, pars 202 ff) [18]. As Jung defined consciousness as the relation of psychic contents to the ego in so far as this relation is perceived as such by the ego (CW 6, par. 700) [17], becoming conscious does not denote the integration, or repair, of dissociation, but rather it denotes perceiving, or being aware of, the relation of psychic contents to the ego. In this sense, the dissociation should become conscious in psychotherapy of neurosis.

This observation forces us to assume that one can deliver oneself from neurosis not by literally trying to get rid of it but only by paradoxically entering into it, staying with it, and thoroughly gazing at it. In this regard, as shown in the above quotation, we can imagine that Jung could clearly penetrate its self-contradictory and uroboric nature, and grasp the true body of neurosis as a manifestation of the soul.

While on the other hand, as pointed out before, as regards his psychological statement, Jung could not complete it so enough. Perhaps, this is closely connected with the fact that he devotedly insisted on his own standpoint not as philosopher but as empiricist when explaining the concept of archetype in his psychology (CW 9i, par. 149) [21]. As shown in Kantian philosophy, the clear discrimination between experience and ideal should be set in the framework of empiricism. Nevertheless, it seems that Jung was not so aware that this discrimination itself is created through a peculiar *Weltanschauung* called empiricism [8]. Namely, on the empirical level the aetiology of neurosis certainly can be described as *disunion with oneself*, but on the psychological level it can no longer be called *disunion with oneself*. Such insight on the

empirical level had to be sublated as psychological one, but it could never been done because of the denial of dissociation between *experience* and *ideal* included in his psychology as a theory. In this point, we can imagine that in the statements included within his psychology there remain *intact* parts which have not yet become fully psychological.

As repeatedly mentioned, on the one hand Jung certainly could reach the true body of neurosis, but on the other hand he could not psychologically express it so enough. If we expand his views toward neurosis, then we come to the conclusion that the nature of neurosis is not dissociation as such but denial of dissociation. In that sense, the dissociation should be regarded not as pathology but as psychological necessity. This is well described in the following Jung's statement; '... I want to stress that although the pathogenic conflict is a personal matter it is also a broadly human conflict manifesting itself in the individual, for *disunity with oneself is the hall-mark of civilized man*' (CW 7, par. 16, my italics) [16].

As already said before, we civilized modern human beings have no way to return. As far as it is viewed as pathology, *civilization* will remain exclusively pathological, that is, something to be repaired, or eliminated. However, such attitude is extremely unpsychological. Rather, we have to re-vision the phenomenon of *civilization* as such, or the concept of disunion with oneself or dissociation itself psychologically.

Through such trial to re-vision it, disunion with oneself, or dissociation, can no longer be regarded as neurotic but we can say that it is a certain kind of *differentiation*. (As shown in the definition by Worland-Skinner, the notion of dissociation itself is really descriptive. Therefore, we can say that it is only our perspective that endows it with values and transforms it into something pathological.) Namely, as shown in Jung's definition, 'DIFFERENTIATION means the development of differences, the separation of parts from a whole. ... Without differentiation direction is impossible, since the direction of a function towards a goal depends on the elimination of anything irrelevant. Fusion with the irrelevant precludes direction; only a differentiated function is *capable* of being directed' (CW 6, par. 705) [17], the dissociation should be regarded not merely as pathological but rather we should understand that it has a similar nuance with such *differentiation*.

Concerning the phenomenon of *civilization*, we must admit that modern human psyche cannot be cured merely by regarding it as *evil* and trying to go back to Nature. That is because, as Jung mentioned (CW 13, par. 414) [25], if psychotherapy can be regarded as *opus contra naturam*, we have to recognize that just through being contradicted with our own nature and then truly obtaining psychological insight can we first individuate, or differentiate, ourselves. In other words, not by simply dreaming of going back to Nature, but 'By becoming conscious, the individual threatened more and more with isolation, which is nevertheless the *sine qua non* of conscious differentiation' (ibid., par. 395) [13].

In addition, we can apply the above-developed discussion in this chapter to our clinical practice as follows: In psychotherapy with any kind of neurotic patients we cannot re-unite the dissociated two from *without*, and furthermore, should not aim at it. That is because it is a kind of illusion, and such illusion is the very neurosis in itself. Therein, we exclusively need to unite with the dissociation itself.

In our practice, especially in analytical setting, we sometimes see patients (or analysands) having the difficulty with vividly realizing their own feelings, or having demand to relate to themselves or to know about themselves furthermore. It is certain that such complaints could be regarded as a kind of depersonalization. Yet, is it true that they can recover from their suffering of this kind by relating to themselves? Rather, they need to recognize that the self becomes itself just because it is disconnected with itself, do not they?

As mentioned before, the modern self is the *reflective self toward itself*, and therein, the dissociation between *reflecting self* and *reflected self* is being created without interruption. If that is the case, we must see that their demand to know about themselves means to know about the dissociation inevitably created by such *self-reflection* and about themselves as *self that is disconnected with itself*, and not merely to relate to themselves once more through knowing about themselves. (That is to say, to respect patients' complaint is quite different from so-called naïve and literal empathy by therapists.)

If we therapists should fail to see the dissociation hidden behind the above-mentioned complaint of theirs and then start psychotherapy with them merely for the purpose of their re-connecting with themselves by knowing about themselves furthermore, would it

already mean the denial of dissociation? Such psychotherapy of neurosis can only be psychotherapy for producing another neurosis, or denial of dissociation. Moreover, we need to recognize that the reason why they are suffering from the above-mentioned symptoms is not that their psyche is dissociated but that their psyche has not yet really been dissociated, that is to say, such dissociation in their personality has not yet been recognized by themselves. Concerning this point, Jung stated, 'Were the conflict [disunion with oneself] clearly conscious in all parts, presumably it would never give rise to neurotic symptoms; these occur only when we cannot see the other side of our nature and the urgency of its problem' (CW 7, par. 27) [16].

In the above-mentioned sense, we are required to psychologically recognize the dissociation as the inevitable premise for the status of our psyche without any denial. I think that only with this recognition we can carry on psychotherapy of neurosis.

In the above-mentioned sense, we are demanded to psychologically recognize the dissociation as the inevitable premise for the status of our psyche without any denial. And it would be only such recognition that could carry on psychotherapy of neurosis.

CONCLUSION

The Actual Task of Psychology Today

As well shown in the historical transition of the notion of neurosis, its diagnostic criteria always has the possibility to contain something 'impure' still now. In reality, it is rather easy for us to point out the differential ambiguity which certainly lies between neurosis and normality, personality disorder, psychosis, psychosomatic disease, and so on. Therefore, some groups of psychiatrists or psychologists (especially in the U.S.) came to insist to give up its controversial aetiology and then exclusively depend on the clinical data in its diagnosis.

Namely, Neurotic Disorders in DSM-II (1968) were afterward divided into Affective Disorders, Anxiety Disorders, Somatoform Disorders, Dissociative Disorders, and Psychosexual Disorders, and so on. (Especially we have to pay attention to the point that so-called conversion hysteria, Conversion Disorder, is classified into Somatoform Disorders, and so-called dissociation hysteria is classified into Dissociative Disorders. What a neurotic, or hysterical, manual they are in itself!)

Although this does not immediately mean that DSM-IV (1994) comes not to deal with Neurotic Disorders, we cannot help having the impression that the notion of neurosis has already been expelled from the sphere of academic psychology or psychiatry because of its ambiguity.

However, here we have to realize that, as Jung insisted, neurosis can contain the psyche just because of such ambiguity (see CW 10, par. 365) [20]. Etymologically, psychology denotes psyche + logos; it, as Jung properly said, must be 'the science of the soul' (CW 12, par. 15) [23]. In that sense, we psychologists must never lose the connection with the psyche or the soul. If we should do so, we would no longer be psychologists. I think that the psychology that has given up the notion of neurosis due to its ambiguity can no longer be a psychology. That is because this justly means to abandon, or lose, the connection with the psyche or the soul. That is to say, it is not that a psychology can treat neurosis, but that psychology can become itself by confronting the notion of neurosis. In this respect, psychology, as Giegerich (1994) mentioned, immediately corresponds to depth-psychology [5] since, among many psychologies, only depth-psychology, not behaviourally but psychically, has been trying to confront with neurosis until today.

In this way, we psychotherapists have been destined to do that as a caretaker for the psyche. So, based on the discussion in this paper, as Giegerich (1998a) pointed out, we should notice that the nature of neurosis consists not merely in dissociation but in *denial of dissociation*, or of *lost of unity* [7]. In this sense, we have to revision Jung's conception *disunion with oneself*, the aetiology of neurosis in his psychology, not as mere *disunion with oneself* but as *disunion with disunion with oneself*. In this condition, neurotics are not aware of their own disunion with themselves; therefore we can say that only one thing we can do in psychotherapy of neurosis is to unite with the dissociation itself, that is, to psychologically recognize the disunity. That is the *union with dissociation*, or *union with disunion with oneself* as the cure of neurosis.

In this regard, we can also say that the union in Jung's psychology always means the *union of union and separation* just like the above-mentioned *union of union and disunion*. We thus can imagine that the neurosis is a certain kind of *nostalgia* of modern human beings for the mythological world, or for the naïve unity with Nature which we have already lost and to which we will never go back again.

The causal thinking in modern natural science such as mentioned in this paper has brought to us the epoch-making progress/development of technology until today. We must admit it correctly, and must not accuse it at all. If we should merely accuse it and try to go back to the past, we would have to regard it as our nostalgia based on our neurotic thinking/feeling. That is, we have to, or can only, seriously accept the civilization as reality.

Moreover, it is not incident that such progress of technology has accompanied with the history of psychology. That is because psychology has its own task therein [6].

For instance, we modern mankind have lost much natural environment in compensation for the amazing development of technology and natural sciences and the great progress of our civilization. We thus have deeply regretted and tried to reflect on it, and as a result herein is the movement of protection of natural environment taking place today. However, can we really view it as a true reflection? (Needless to say, here I do not want to accuse such movement itself, but justly want to insist on the necessity to reflect on our fundamental standpoint included therein once more.)

That is to say, nature as an object to be protected, like nature as an object to be destroyed, has already become essentially different from Great Nature surrounding our ancestors in olden days. In our attitude to try to protect natural environment, we have to see the same orientation as we have maintained in destroying it [31]. This is a true psychological reflection, and it is an actual task of psychology today to bring such an insight to us.

In that sense, we can assume that psychology is demanded to see through to the so-called modernity without merely rejecting the causal framework of natural science or royally obeying to it. That is because today natural scientific/causationistic thinking has come to regard such discrimination as mentioned above as a *priori* by forgetting itself having practice it. Such, too, would be denial of dissociation. As clearly shown in the *Weltanschauung* of natural science, various kinds of cracks, or cleavages, have appeared in the world due to the psychological fact that we human beings have established the consciousness of our own consciousness. This should not be regarded as neurotic in itself, but we have to see it as a certain kind of differentiation. Rather, as shown in this paper, we can even find the parallelism between natural science and neurosis in the sense that, forgetting nothing but their own

consciousness/*Weltanschauung* creating them, they alike have an illusion to re-construct the world without any disunity, or dissociation, through covering the cracks opened between various phenomena in the world with their reductive/ causationistic thinking. Psychology must well recognize it and furthermore, psychologically see that even natural science and neurosis as depicted above is a trial to transform the status of our consciousness on the basis of the soul's intention. As seen before, there is no doubt that Jung could grasp it on the level of his experience.

In the above-mentioned sense, we can say that, unlike Freud's assumption, what is demanded for psychology is not to become one faculty of natural sciences but to go beyond natural sciences. Namely, psychology, without merely rejecting the causal thinking or obeying to it without any reflection, has to penetrate the structure of modern natural scientific *Weltanschauung* as such.

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